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ABSTRACT  
Online health communities (OHC) are collectives of individuals that use Internet 
forums to share health-related information and empower patients to make informed 
health decisions. Like other online communities (OC), OHC are social spaces of 
knowledge production and innovation. By extending knowledge and innovation 
production beyond the traditional boundaries of expert organizations and professional 
practice, OHC can present epistemic dangers by challenging the epistemic authority 
of experts based on unsubstantiated knowledge claims. At the light of the benefits as 
well as potential dangers of knowledge peer-production in OHC, this study 
investigates the epistemic practices of a diabetes online community. Drawing on a 
virtue epistemology perspective, findings show that individual participants to this 
study and the community as a collective were motivated and capable of enacting 
virtuous epistemic practices. Yet, the study also demonstrated the ambivalence of 
apparently virtuous epistemic practices, which could have unintended consequences 
and conceal epistemic vices. This study contributes to the literature on knowledge co-




members of an OC can act as epistemic autonomous agents and behave in an 
epistemically safe and responsible way; second, it demonstrates the collective agency 
of an OC in facilitating epistemically responsible practices; third, it draws 
implications concerning the epistemic consequences of OC sites and their materiality; 
finally, it guides both patients and healthcare professionals on the epistemic practices 
patients should adopt when using OHC as a source of peer support and health self-
management.  
Keywords: Online communities, epistemologies, epistemic practices, knowledge, 
healthcare  
Introduction 
Online health communities (OHC) are a collective of individuals that make use of 
Internet forums to share information about their medical condition and treatment 
(Bernardi 2016; Josefsson 2005). In these communities, patients find answers to the 
many questions about living with a chronic medical condition, which cannot be 
answered in a five-minute consultation with their healthcare professionals. 
Knowledge shared in OHC is a key source of community engagement and an 
important resource for health self-management and patient empowerment (Johnston et 
al. 2013; van Berkel et al. 2015). Like in other online communities (OC), knowledge 
creation and sharing are important social activities that sustain OHC (Faraj et al. 
2016). Research on OC has mainly focused on peer-content production on web 
platforms such as Wikipedia (e.g. Arazy et al. 2016); sourcing of ideas from 
customers through user innovation communities (e.g. Blohm et al. 2016); temporary 
online crowds such as open innovation challenges (e.g. Majchrzak and Malhotra 




OHC represent a far less studied and understood type of OC as spaces for user-led 
production of knowledge that, traditionally, was of exclusive domain of scientific and 
professional experts.  
The widespread use of social media and other Web 2.0 technologies has blurred 
the boundaries not only between production and consumption of knowledge, but also 
between expert and “non-expert” knowledge. Nowadays, Internet users are 
empowered through the co-production of knowledge tailored to their own needs and 
preferences. Therefore, digital technologies have extended knowledge and innovation 
production beyond the traditional boundaries of expert organisations (e.g. medical 
research institutes) and professional practice (e.g. clinical practice). By “decentring” 
the production of health knowledge from medical authorities to patients, OHC have 
the potential to transform healthcare by promoting healthy behaviours and producing 
patient-centred knowledge (Petrakaki et al. 2018). Nevertheless, peer production of 
knowledge can present “epistemic dangers” (Choo 2016b), in that it challenges the 
epistemic authority of experts based on unsubstantiated knowledge claims (Doty 
2015). For example, a dilemma in healthcare is: how can we be reassured of the 
reliability of knowledge claims in OC, particularly in situations where these claims 
give rise to new healthcare management practices that have not been sanctioned by a 
medical institutional body? Understanding epistemic practices in these communities, 
i.e. how their members process and transform knowledge, is thus important because 
they affect the creation of new health management practices adopted within a patient 
population. In turn, these new practices can lead to tensions with institutionally 
accepted norms and practices of knowledge production in a scientific field. This can 
cause resistance from the scientific community to new forms of open innovation that 




spread of fake news and user-generated content whose denial of scientific discoveries 
can harm the advancement of science and, most of all, humanity and society as a 
whole (see examples of anti-vaccine (Doty 2015) and global warming OC (Vähämaa 
2013)). Therefore, knowing how to differentiate between safe and unsafe epistemic 
practices in OC is important to encourage a pluralistic model of innovation in medical 
practice (Kirmayer 2012) and more widely in scientific research (Anonymous 2018). 
In the light of these considerations, this paper will address the following research 
question: what are the individual and collective epistemic practices that support a 
virtuous production of knowledge and practice innovation in OHC? This research 
draws on social epistemology and, more specifically, virtue epistemology (Baehr 
2011; Zagzebski 1996) to understand to what extent OHC can act as epistemically 
virtuous agents, that is, agents who contribute, interpret, and evaluate knowledge in 
an “intellectually appropriate or rational way” (Baehr 2011) and who are motivated 
and have the ability to achieve justified true beliefs (Kornblith 1983). In other words, 
epistemically virtuous agents do not mislead and do not let others mislead them with 
false propositions. Specifically, this paper investigates the epistemic practices of 
members of a diabetes OC in the UK. This study will benefit patients and healthcare 
professionals with more knowledge about how OHC can be used responsibly as a 
useful source of health information and peer support. Implications from this research 
can also guide OC managers on the design of OHC that afford a balanced deliberation 
of contrasting views. 
Online Communities as spaces for innovation  
OC are social spaces where collectives of individuals share information about 




idea of OC as emerging forms of organising that drive knowledge production and 
innovation. Due to their fluid, dynamic, and open nature, OC facilitate knowledge 
contributions and the sharing of ideas from a multitude of members (Faraj et al. 
2016). Yet, their same open and dynamic nature has attracted an emerging body of 
research interested in how OC can build and sustain the capacity of producing quality 
knowledge and delivering value to their members and other stakeholders (e.g. Barrett 
et al. 2016). For example, in a study about Wikipedia, Arazy et al. (2016) 
demonstrated how community mechanisms can have a stabilizing effect on the 
behaviour of individual emergent roles and, thereby, ensure quality and consistency in 
knowledge co-production. Majchrzak and Malhotra (2016) showed what type of 
knowledge-sharing trajectories and epistemic practices can generate innovative 
outcomes in a temporary online crowd. These studies increase our understanding of 
how fluid and continuously shaping forms of organizing in OC can ensure quality and 
innovativeness in knowledge production.  
Similar research about OHC has mainly focused on how their users validate 
knowledge by navigating among the medical literature, healthcare professional 
advice, their own and their peers’ lived experience (Kazmer et al. 2014). Other 
research has focused on the role of epistemologies, i.e. people’s views about what 
knowledge is and how they come to know things about the world (Hofer and Pintrich 
1997), in shaping people’s understanding of knowledge and epistemic practices in 
these communities. In particular, research shows that patients’ use of social media has 
led to the emergence of alternative epistemologies that are grounded in experiential 
knowledge, i.e. you know through intuition, anecdotal evidence, and personal 
experience with a disease (Broom and Tovey 2007), and subjective experience (e.g. 




through socialization and shared experience above the epistemic authority of medical 
professionals (Whelan 2007). 
Therefore, existing research offers a rich and varied account of how individuals 
view and experience knowledge shared in OHC for the management of their own 
health. Yet, less is known about the epistemic practices of single community members 
and OC as epistemic agents in generating and maintaining positive epistemic 
outcomes. The study presented in this paper is a first step towards enriching our 
understanding in this area. In particular, it will focus on: i. how individuals can 
distinguish the value and appropriateness of knowledge generated in OC to achieve 
their goals; and ii. how the community epistemic practices can maintain quality and 
consistency in knowledge production. Understanding these two issues is particularly 
important in the context of OC that produce lay knowledge to complement expert 
knowledge as in the case of OHC.  
Social epistemology and epistemic practices in online communities 
Social epistemology builds on the notion that human knowledge is acquired 
socially from other people or secondary sources such as texts and books, and not 
through first-hand evidence (Doty 2015). A classical approach to social epistemology 
views social epistemic practices and institutions as means through which individuals 
form a “justified true belief” and their understanding of knowledge (Fallis 2006). That 
knowing is a social process is particularly evident on the Internet and even more so in 
OC, where people deliberate on information, scientific evidence, and news shared by 
others. The social nature of knowledge explains the difficulties in evaluating and 




Both individual users and the community as a collective are responsible for how 
community members form their understanding of knowledge shared online. On the 
one hand, research shows how members of OC get to believe whether or not a claim 
is true through individual claims of cognitive authority and by giving primacy to their 
first-hand experience over other sources of knowledge (Doty 2015). This is possible 
thanks to the personal nature of the Internet, which gives laypeople the means to 
exercise personal authority and to contest knowledge claims from mainstream media 
and public institutions. The contestation of others’ authorities based on 
unsubstantiated knowledge claims contradicts social epistemology about the social 
nature of knowledge production. 
On the other hand, due to their social and open nature, OC can have positive 
epistemic effects. Community members hold each other accountable for the 
information they share (Faraj et al. 2016), thereby affording constructive criticism and 
feedback to correct error and bias (Choo 2016a). Yet, the sociality of OC can also 
present epistemic risks. For example, research has shown how users of OC tend to 
trust information from members that share similar perspectives or values (Brady et al. 
2016) and to form social network ties with people that share common social 
characteristics (Centola and van de Rijt 2015). Other studies have claimed that users 
who are active knowledge contributors and strongly identify with an OC value the 
stability of the community more than the attainment of truth (Vähämaa 2013). 
Therefore, the very social nature of OC might encourage individuals’ propensity to 
deal with disagreement by defending and conforming to the beliefs of their social 
group rather than update their beliefs and achieve new learning (Choo 2016b).  
This literature suggests the quality of knowledge exchanged in OC and the value 




to act as intellectually virtuous agents both as individuals and as part of a collective. It 
will thus investigate the intellectual qualities of epistemic practices shared in a 
diabetes OC in order to assess their epistemic safety. In particular, it will investigate 
whether the selection, evaluation, and contribution of knowledge in this community is 
based on reasoned argument and justification. 
Virtue epistemology 
Virtue epistemology studies the social production of knowledge based on the 
personal traits and qualities of epistemic agents rather than the justification of beliefs 
(Choo 2016c). In other words, virtue epistemology is more interested in the 
intellectual qualities and faculties of epistemic agents that motivate and guide 
epistemic enquiry, i.e. “an active and intentional search for the truth about some 
question” (Baehr 2011), than the actual practices that they adopt to evaluate and 
justify knowledge. The focus on agency is important because it calls the attention to 
the moral and intellectual obligations of epistemic agents given that what they decide 
to believe as true can have an impact on members of their community or social group 
(Code 1987). 
According to Zagzebski (1996), an epistemic virtue has two elements: i. the 
motivation to achieve a desired goal; and ii. success in achieving that goal. The 
combination of these two elements is important to achieve an epistemically virtuous 
behaviour. For example, motivation of an epistemically virtuous agent goes beyond 
the desire for truth and involves a genuine cognitive effort to get in touch with reality 
in order to find the truth. Individuals that are only motivated by the desire for truth 
risk falling trap of intellectual dogmatism, an intellectual vice that induces an agent to 




(Choo 2016c). Likewise, the success component requires people to be open to new 
ideas, even when these ideas may contradict their own beliefs, showing the 
intellectual virtue of open-mindedness. It also requires individuals to be willing to 
defend their beliefs when they are under attack and when they have good reasons to 
believe that they are right, demonstrating intellectual courage.   
The production of knowledge is a social process. Therefore, its justification occurs 
through social interaction (Longino 2001). In particular, Longino (2001) indicates that 
“critical discursive interaction” is a crucial social mechanism through which 
knowledge is justified and justified true beliefs formed. The importance of critical 
discursive interaction in knowledge evaluation and production is that it can encourage 
disagreement and dissent. Positive dissent and disagreement can offer competing 
views about a topic or issue. Multiple accounts are acknowledged and considered, and 
even though they might not lead to a solution or agreement, they offer a multiple 
perspective on the complexity and subtlety of a problem (Longino 2001). Critical 
discursive interactions are particularly important in the context of OHC since they can 
help members understand the complexity and uncertainty of medical knowledge.  
Research method  
This paper draws on a research project about the epistemic practices of members 
of Diabetes.co.uk ongoing since June 2017. Diabetes.co.uk is a UK-based public 
forum whose membership counts over 600,000 members. The forum hosts patient-led 
discussions about alternative treatments of diabetes such as the low carb diet. In spite 
of the potential benefits of low carbing for Type 2 diabetes (Diabetes UK 2017), 
official clinical guidelines in the UK recommend a diet high in carbs. Therefore, the 




act as epistemically virtuous agents while managing the contradictions between 
clinical advice and knowledge shared in the community. This research adopts 
qualitative data collection methods including one focus group of about 90 minutes 
with 7 forum members (held in June 2017), semi-structured interviews averaging 50 
minutes with 45 forum members (collected between June and August 2017; June and 
July 2018; November and December 2018), and virtual ethnography (planned 
between January and June 2019). Details of participants whose data are reported in 
this paper are summarized in Table 1.  
Table 1 
List of Participants 
ID Type of 
diabetes 
Years/months 
with diabetes  
Forum 
membership 
P01 T1 25 years 8 years 
P02 None N/A 10 years 
P03 T2 4 years 4 years 
P04 T2 12 years 4 years 
P05 T1 41 years N/A 
P06 T2 N/A 5 years 
P07 T2 7 years N/A 
P08 T1 5 years  4 years 
P09 T2 2 years 2 years 
P10 T1 31 years 2 years 
P11 T2 2 years 2 years 
P12 T1 40 years 2 years 
P13 T2 2 months 2 months 
P14 T2 2 weeks 2 weeks 
P15 None  0 5 years 
P16 T1 25 years 1 year 
P17 None  0 2 years 
P18 T2 10 years 4 years 
 
Since this is a research in progress, this paper illustrates findings from the focus 
group (P01-P07) and 11 interviews (P08-P18) during which participants were asked 




knowledge contribution; and their experience with the community in helping a shared 
understanding and the production of user-generated content. Participants were 
recruited both through the forum and through a survey that asked participants to leave 
their contact if they wished to take part to the interview. The research has ethical 
approval from the University of Bristol. Both the focus group and interviews were 
digitally recorded, with participants’ permission, transcribed and anonymised.  
The analysis of data follows an inductive methodology to identify common 
instances of epistemic practices and their associated intellectual virtues and vices. 
Being open to the emergence of new themes, the coding process was guided by 
concepts from social epistemology and virtue epistemology and, in particular, the 
intellectual virtues and vices found in the literature.  
Findings 
Individual epistemic practices 
Initiate epistemic enquiry 
The majority of participants with T2 diabetes started searching for new 
information about diabetes soon after diagnosis and found the diabetes forum through 
an Internet search. Their motivation was to find answers to questions about the causes 
of diabetes, its complications, and how it can be treated. The majority of participants 
with T1 diabetes had lived with diabetes for several years. Therefore, they were more 
experienced about their condition. Their motivation for looking for information on the 
forum was mainly to find out about new medical innovations such as insulin pumps, 
people’s experience with different types of insulin, and practical information on how 




One epistemic virtue that motivated their search for information was intellectual 
curiosity. Intellectual curiosity is a key trait that motivates an agent to investigate a 
subject matter or issue that are significant (Baehr 2011). Intellectual curiosity is a 
natural inclination to learn more knowledge. Yet, for many study participants, 
intellectual curiosity did not reflect just a disinterested love for knowledge. Worry and 
concern motivated a person newly diagnosed with T2 diabetes to know more about 
what causes diabetes, its complications, and how to treat it. This participant with T2 
diabetes said: 
“I started using the forum in October 2015. I was fairly sure I was about to be 
diagnosed with Type 2 diabetes.  I’d been to the doctors about an unrelated issue and 
he said, “You should have a HbA1c test”, which I probably had no idea what it was 
then, but then obviously I started to get a bit worried and thought I’d start to do some 
research on diabetes and the possible treatments for it” (P09). 
The majority of participants also felt that the support they were receiving from 
their medical professionals and the health service in general was either insufficient or 
inadequate. This is another reason why they felt the need for more information on 
how to manage diabetes and found in the forum the kind of support that they could 
not find anywhere else in the health service. Intellectual courage, namely, the 
willingness to consider alternatives that are contrary to popular beliefs (Montmarquet 
1992), was another key quality that motivated several participants to explore 
alternative ideas in the management of diabetes that were not really in line with the 
standard advice from the national health service. For example, for T2 diabetes, many 
healthcare professionals would recommend a drug therapy accompanied with a diet 




lowering their blood glucose in the normal range with a low-carb diet. These success 
stories were usually backed up with experiential evidence (for example, members 
record their blood glucose results in their profile signature) and scientific medical 
research. This evidence gave participants the confidence to know more about how diet 
can help them manage diabetes, as shown in this quote by a participant with T2 
diabetes, even if it contravenes official medical advice:  
“On the [UK National Health Service] website, […] it doesn’t really talk about low 
carbs, it didn’t really explain to me that [diabetes] was caused by carbohydrates, […] 
and it didn’t say to me, the first thing to do is to really look radically at your 
carbohydrates. I honestly thought all I had to do was stop eating sweets. […] What 
you won’t find on there is anything about what I would consider, and radical might be 
the wrong word, but I would consider progressive things such as a low carb, high fat 
diet, a low protein, low fat diet, the Newcastle diet” (P13). 
Evaluate other people’s testimony 
In social epistemology “testimony from others” is the social act of exchanging 
knowledge between a speaker and a hearer (Choo 2016a). An important issue in 
social epistemology is how epistemic agents evaluate other people’s testimony to 
justify a piece of information or evidence as “true” (Fallis 2006). Participants to this 
study evaluated knowledge on the online forum through three epistemic practices: i. 
the evaluation and selection of knowledge through embodied and emotional 
experience; ii. careful scrutiny and observation of evidence; and iii. the selection of 
evidence that confirms one’s beliefs and desires.  
The evaluation and selection of knowledge based on embodied and emotional 




and b) experiential learning, i.e. their own experience of experimenting with new 
ideas on how to manage diabetes. According to many participants, they needed to 
know whether and how a treatment or a new approach to managing diabetes had 
worked for other people before experimenting it on themselves. In an interview, a 
participant with T2 diabetes said: 
“Other people’s experiences [give] you a huge insight in to what other people are 
doing, and I tend to pick and choose and experiment on myself quite a lot to see what 
works for me. If it works for me, then I carry on doing it; if it doesn’t work for me, 
then I just try something else” (P09). 
 This and other interviews revealed open-mindedness, intellectual temperance 
(or sobriety), and intellectual reflectiveness as three important intellectual virtues 
that participants displayed in the evaluation of experiential evidence. Open-
mindedness reflects one’s attitude to be open to new ideas, even to ideas that 
contradict their beliefs or experience, as well as the “mental flexibility” that is 
required to evaluate various alternatives and arguments to address a problem (Baehr 
2011). For example, a few participants with T2 diabetes said they chose which diet 
was best for them based on the reasoned evaluation of other forum members’ 
experience. This approach also shows intellectual temperance, i.e. a moderate appetite 
for knowledge that guides our choices to consider new ideas worth of our attention 
because they have sufficient and reasonable supporting evidence (Battaly 2011; 
Montmarquet 1992). With reference to the example above, similarities across forum 
members’ stories and their own experience with diabetes gave participants reason to 
believe in the usefulness of ideas and tips shared online. Finally, intellectual 




experience and reasoned evidence, guided participants knowledge enquiry and 
informed their decision as to whether a new treatment or diet they were experimenting 
was good for them. For example, several participants with T2 diabetes monitored 
their blood glucose level regularly to assess whether they could control diabetes 
through diet. Yet, the reliance on experiential evidence can also present some 
epistemic risks. For example, it can induce us to consider stories of people that have 
similar traits as ours (e.g. age, personal background) and with whom we identify the 
most as suggested by this focus group participant with T2 diabetes: 
“There is almost always somebody there who’s had, who’s got the same thing as you 
are, [with whom you will share] a certain amount of commonality, and because of the 
huge population, there is always going to be people like me or people like you, or you, 
or you, or you that you can identify with” (P03). 
 The tendency of listening to people we identify with can induce us to fall trap of 
learning myopia since it restricts our learning space to people that share 
commonalities with us, and, consequently, it reduces our chances to acquire new 
learning through argumentation, dissent, and critical discursive interactions (Levinthal 
and March 1993). This risk can be reduced through a careful scrutiny and observation 
of evidence, as experienced by several participants. In particular, participants 
mentioned various ways in which they validated knowledge from the forum. First, 
they checked for consistency between what someone stated to have done or achieved 
against their previous posts. In this way, they could build a profile and establish the 
credibility of that person. Second, they relied on “peer-validation”, that is, they 
checked whether there was consensus about a post from other members. The activity 




advice given was sensible. Finally, the majority of participants cross-referenced what 
they were reading in the forum with scientific research available on the Internet. 
Others discussed the advice given in the forum with a medical professional. Those 
that had lived with diabetes for a long time also used their experience to judge 
whether a post was sensible.  
These epistemic practices were guided by intellectual autonomy, intellectual 
scrutiny, and intellectual consistency and objectivity. Intellectual autonomy 
indicates that an agent is free and capable of choosing and forming independent 
opinions (Zagzebski 1996). For example, a participant with T2 diabetes explained 
how she formed her own independent opinion of how managing diabetes with 
alternative methods might be better than changing insulin: 
“Having been abroad for six months where I didn’t have the option to change insulin, 
it was very useful to try other techniques which might have helped me. […] I have 
changed insulin before, and it’s a very difficult process, so I’m not 100% convinced 
that changing my insulin is the way to go, so any other sort of options that I have, I’m 
willing to try. And that’s where the forum has come in very useful because other 
people who have had similar problems have tried many different things and can say, 
you know, have you tried this, this works for me” (P16).  
Intellectual scrutiny is necessary to develop a “sufficient and appropriate focus” 
on the subtleties and details of a problem (Baehr 2011). For example, in this interview 
a participant with T2 diabetes explained how he cautiously verified the veracity of a 
statement by another forum member: 
“I have to be very careful because some people will say something and quite often I 




GPs [General Practitioners] have to pay a fine if a certain percentage of their 
patients weren’t prescribed statins. Now that doesn’t sound right, and it isn’t right. 
What they actually meant was […] an incentive is made to a GP’s surgery if at least 
50 percent of his patients have cholesterol levels within a certain range. […] I’m very 
careful with everything I read and I will spend a lot of time double checking things” 
(P18). 
Finally, intellectual consistency and objectivity ensure that one evaluates 
information fairly and consistently by adopting good standards that guarantee an 
unbiased evaluation of information (Baehr 2011). Participants did not believe in what 
they were told in the forum straight away, but they consistently reviewed a piece of 
information against other evidence (e.g. the posting history and profile of posters, 
other members’ posts, scientific evidence and, even though less frequently, medical 
professional advice). An example of how intellectual consistency and objectivity 
guided the evaluation of knowledge on the forum is offered by this focus group 
participant with T2 diabetes:  
“You’ve got to be able to filter the information that you receive through your own 
critical functions and you have to filter out some of the things that are just not 
credible. […] You can describe yourself as ‘I’m 6ft 8inch’ sort of thing, […] but 
nobody on there could say, ‘No, that’s not true.’  But they may say, ‘the consistency 
between other posts and things that he’s made, actually doesn’t make that a credible 
statement’” (P07). 
The majority of participants were self-motivated individuals with clear diabetes 
management goals. A common goal for participants with T2 diabetes, for example, 




having clear goals to achieve can motivate epistemic enquiry. Yet, they can also 
induce an agent to focus their epistemic enquiry on evidence that confirms one’s 
beliefs and desires, such as that managing T2 diabetes without medication is the only 
right way to go. An intellectual vice that reflects this attitude is confirmation bias, 
namely, the tendency to give preference to evidence that supports one’s beliefs while 
discarding or refusing to collect evidence that goes against them. A tendency among 
some participants with T2 diabetes, for example, was to concentrate their epistemic 
enquiry on success stories and scientific evidence that proves the benefits of specific 
diets for the management of diabetes. They were less concerned to look for evidence 
that offered a less positive argument about the effectiveness of these diets. In the 
example that follows, one participant with T2 diabetes is clearly convinced of the 
effectiveness of low-carb diets based on the success stories of a multitude of forum 
members: 
“Everybody on their forum signatures has their history and numbers, so you can see 
when they were diagnosed, and how much they weighed, and what their diet was, and 
then you can see […] their low carb diets […] all of them chart their journeys in 
terms of their blood glucose meters and then they will say, “I’m in remission” or, 
“I’m off my meds” or, “I’m reducing my meds”. […] So, yes, just in terms of 
empirical evidence there’s loads, and […] it gets to the point where it’s just really, 
really hard to deny that low carbing is the way to beat diabetes” (P14). 
Even though these stories are encouraging, a virtuous epistemic enquiry warrants 
the use of contrasting evidence to form an unbiased opinion.  




Another epistemic practice is peer-disagreement, whereby agents have the 
opportunity to critically engage in a discussion about contrasting views and opinions 
with their peers (e.g. members of an OC). Peer-disagreement is considered to lead to 
positive epistemic effects by stimulating learning and by providing individuals with 
the opportunity to review their beliefs based on a reasoned analysis of multiple 
perspectives about a complex problem (Choo 2016a). For peer-disagreement to 
happen, it is important that members of an OC express their own disagreement and 
respond to other members’ contrasting views. In this respect, this study identified two 
epistemic practices: i. conflict avoidance by refraining from manifesting 
disagreement; and ii. express disagreement with reason and argument. Several 
participants interviewed gave evidence of the first practice. Conflict avoidance by 
refraining from manifesting disagreement can prevent peer-disagreement from 
happening and, therefore, is a missed learning opportunity for other members of the 
community. Nevertheless, it was an epistemic virtue – intellectual humility – that 
guided this practice. Intellectual humility is the tendency to recognize one’s own 
knowledge and one’s ability to acquire knowledge (Zagzebski 1996) and, in the 
specific context of this study, to express disagreement that encourages critical 
discussion. For example, one participant with T2 diabetes expressed disbelief at 
another forum members’ suggestion to participate to a doughnuts challenge and see 
whose blood glucose goes up the most. He gave the following justification for not 
replying to this post in order to express disagreement:  
“I don’t like conflict on the forum. People can misinterpret mails and things like that. 
I watched other people, who were perhaps more confident, have been on the forum 




correcting people, but at the moment, I feel like I am still in the junior school, not in 
the post-grad school” (P13). 
 Intellectual humility also guided the second epistemic practice, i.e. expressing 
disagreement with reason and argument, which, arguably, can be more successful in 
encouraging a healthy debate. An example of this practice is offered by this one 
participant with T2 diabetes and his response to community members complaining 
about their General Practitioner (GP) (the primary care doctor in the UK): 
“I always have to start with the sentence, ‘I must be very lucky because my 
experience is different and this is what happened.’ But I also emphasize  - when 
people really moan about whatever’s happened at the surgery and the hospital, I say, 
“Have you told them?” You’re gaining nothing, […] unless you actually discuss […] 
with the people you’re blaming for your issues” (P18).  
This participant was intellectually humble since he did not confront other forum 
members by telling them ‘they were wrong’ but expressed his disagreement by 
making them reflect on how they could improve a situation.  
Contributing knowledge 
Contributing knowledge is another important epistemic practice in an OC. 
Without the knowledge that community members share, positive epistemic effects 
such as increased learning would not materialize. Yet, for this knowledge to produce 
positive epistemic beliefs – for example, by preventing misinformation – community 
members need to be conscious of the limits of their own knowledge in general and, in 
the specific case of OHC, of the complexity of medical knowledge. In this respect, 
participants contributed knowledge through two main epistemic practices: i. assess 




advice. These practices were characterized by two intellectual virtues, intellectual 
humility and intellectual caution. Concerning the first practice, intellectual humility, 
as defined in the previous section, allowed participants to decide whether they could 
answer another member’s query based on an honest assessment of their knowledge 
and experience. Intellectual humility also guided the second practice, i.e. share 
experience without giving advice. By recognizing the limits of their own knowledge 
and experience, participants did not advise other forum members on what they should 
do but let them form their own judgment based on their experience, as stated by this 
participant with T1 diabetes: 
“I would never say this is what you should do, I always put it from my personal point 
of view, so this is what has worked for me, for example or when I was a teenager this 
happened and I tried this, I wouldn’t say I was giving direct advice just more telling 
my story or my side of things.” (P16). 
This approach to sharing knowledge also entails intellectual caution about one’s 
beliefs and what can be said in a given situation (Zagzebski 1996). Through 
intellectual caution, participants recognized that everyone is different, and what might 
work for them might not work for someone else, as explained by this participant with 
T1 diabetes: 
“I’m always very careful to put that they are my opinions, and if something affects me 
in a particular way then I’ll say, “For me I need to do this, but everybody is 
different”(P12). 
The statement “everybody is different” shows critical understanding about the 
complexity of medical knowledge. This is a virtuous epistemic quality: it helps forum 




but encourages them to continue their epistemic enquiry to satisfy their appetite for 
knowledge.  
Collective epistemic practices 
Guide epistemic enquiry  
Having analysed the epistemic practices of individual forum members, central to 
this paper is also to investigate collective epistemic practices in OC and how they can 
encourage a virtuous epistemic enquiry. A first practice is encouraging and guiding 
independent epistemic enquiry, as shown in the example given by a participant with 
T2 diabetes:  
“Somebody who was a newbie to low carb high fat […] said that they liked carrots 
but they noticed it was off the list. […] So the general responses were, “Eat to your 
meter”. […] That means take your blood sugars before and test. So have a meal that 
you would know wouldn’t give you high blood sugars, test, then the next day, have the 
same meal, add the carrots in and see what results you get. If you don’t get a spike [in 
your blood sugars],… then that’s right for you” (P11).  
In this example, forum members did not told the enquirer whether or not to eat 
carrots, but gave some practical advice that the enquirer could use to collect enough 
evidence to make an independent informed decision. This and other examples show 
how forum members can foster intellectual autonomy among their peers by 
encouraging them to form independent epistemic judgments about information shared 
on the forum.  
Another way in which forum members encourage independent epistemic enquiry 
and foster intellectual autonomy is by sharing personal stories about their 




shown, forum members that contribute knowledge to the forum tend not to be 
prescriptive and refrain from giving instructions of what others should do. It is up to 
members of the forum to draw lessons on how to manage their own diabetes from 
other people’s experience. In addition, forum members are generally concerned about 
the impact that their posts can have on other members’ life. For the most part, the 
tendency is not to misinform or harm people, as suggested by a focus group 
participant with Type 2 diabetes, who’s also a moderator of the forum: 
“With something like diabetes, people who’ve experienced the diagnosis and all that, 
[and] who’ve had that shocking experience, very few are going to say, ‘Oh forget it, 
you’ll be fine, keep digging into those Jammie Dodgers [Ed. a popular British 
biscuit], you’ll be fine, don’t worry about that’. Most people are concerned for them 
because they remember how it felt” (P03). 
The majority of people on the forum have the common goal to manage their 
diabetes. They do not have an interest in harming other members by providing false 
and misleading information. Such sensitivity about their knowledge contribution 
reflects the intellectual integrity (Baehr 2011) that drives epistemic practices in the 
community. 
One last collective epistemic practice that encourages independent epistemic 
enquiry is to build focus on the details of a problem. Such practice reflects the 
epistemic virtue of intellectual scrutiny, since it develops a “sufficient and 
appropriate focus” on the subtleties and details of a problem (Baehr 2011). In this 
regard, a participant with T1 diabetes said: 
“What you tend to find is that when people post on a subject, […] if somebody gives 




further responses on the forum.  So […] there's a consensus […] that the advice given 
has been beneficial and is positive for that person. […]” (P08). 
Manage peer-disagreement 
Earlier it was discussed how individual participants expressed and managed 
disagreement. The focus of this section is on peer-disagreement by the community as 
a collective agent. Three main practices for managing peer-disagreement were 
identified: i. build collective agreement and consensus; ii. discipline epistemic 
intemperance and hubris; and iii. moderate knowledge contribution.  
Building collective agreement and consensus is about resolving rather than 
cultivating peer-disagreement. A key mechanism to achieve consensus is through 
material features inbuilt in the forum site such as “likes” or other emoticons to 
express agreement with an idea or position. Earlier, I discussed the response of one 
participant to other members complaining about their physician. At the question about 
the reaction to his post from other members of the forum, he replied:  
“It kind of goes a bit quiet. You get several people who suddenly agree with you, but 
again the perpetrator, as it were, doesn’t really say an awful lot, because I think 
sometimes they realize, ‘yeah, he’s probably right, but I’m not going to admit to it’” 
(P18). 
This evidence suggests that peer-agreement mechanisms embedded in online 
platforms can lead participants to relinquish their own ideas and beliefs and adhere to 
the ideas and beliefs of the majority. This conformist tendency can nullify the positive 
epistemic effects of peer-disagreement, by silencing dissent and, therefore, inducing 




to provide a reasoned justification of beliefs and actions that contradict the beliefs 
held by the majority of community members. 
Another practice related to peer-disagreement is to discipline epistemic 
intemperance and hubris. As opposed to the epistemic virtue of intellectual 
temperance, epistemic intemperance is the vice of the “enthusiast” who has appetite 
for new and unfamiliar ideas that do not have sufficient supporting evidence to 
warrant epistemic enquiry and justify a true belief (Montmarquet 1992). Epistemic 
hubris, the opposite of intellectual humility, reflects an agent’s overconfidence in 
one’s knowledge, credibility, and expertise, and one’s presumption of being above 
knowledge. According to participants, if someone’s posts reflect any of these 
intellectual vices, forum members are quick in putting them right as shown by the 
following response to the member that launched a doughnut challenge:  
“That is just one example of many I have seen where the advice has just been wrong. 
However, I would also add there is a lot of correction that goes on, so when people do 
post things that are wrong, then you get quite a flurry of people who say, ‘That is not 
right, that is not right.’ so, it is almost self-moderating” (P13). 
Inviting a person with diabetes to take part in a “doughnut” challenge is not only 
morally wrong but also epistemically wrong since it can induce someone to believe 
that they can eat as many doughnuts as they want and still be fine. This is untrue. 
Hence, in this example, forum members demonstrated intellectual courage, that is, 
they had good reasons to believe they were right and had the right confidence and 
ability to achieve the truth by correcting an epistemically wrong and dangerous 




Peer-moderation of knowledge contribution is another practice through which 
forum members manage peer-disagreement as reported in the focus group and the 
interviews. In this regard, a focus group participant with T2 diabetes gave an account 
of how peer-moderation is practiced in the forum:  
“It’s the bulk of the members, it’s the moderators, it’s the rules on the forum, but it’s 
also the rest of the responsible members, because somebody comes on and says, ‘No, 
Jammie Dodgers are ace, you can live on them, I just inject insulin for it.’ And you 
get a whole host of Type 1s saying, ‘Yes, you may be able to inject insulin for it, but 
it’s not a balanced diet, is it?’”(P6). 
In the spirit of “critical discursive interaction”, the management of disagreement 
in an epistemically virtuous way should not compel people to agree with an idea, but 
should help them base their judgment on reason and argument (Longino 2001).  
Likewise, in this example, forum members encouraged critical discourse and 
reflection through reason and argument. They did not say ‘you are wrong!’ or ‘you 
are going to kill yourself!’. They simply put the other forum member in front of the 
reasoned argument that what he was suggesting was not a balanced healthy behaviour 
and left this individual decide what to do next. In this example, the forum response to 
peer-disagreement encouraged the speaker to reflect critically upon his or her own 
experience in line with the epistemic virtue of intellectual reflectiveness.  
Peer-moderation through “critical discursive interaction” also has the epistemic 
benefit of ensuring intellectual consistency and objectivity since it can correct and 
validate information. A participant with T1 diabetes gave the example of one forum 
member correcting a post that was wrongly stating that berries were high in 




forum members to correct and ensure the validity of information, shared on the 
forum: 
“There is a danger that if you take the first response and walk away, you may get 
incorrect information, but if you allow the threads to persist for a short while, any 
incorrect information is always corrected, so I think it’s almost always valid 
information and useful information” (P10). 
Discussion 
This study casts light on the epistemic practices of members of an OC both as 
individuals and as members of a collective. Given the limited research about the 
mechanisms through which OC can sustain quality knowledge production (Arazy et 
al. 2016), this study provides a unique insight into the implications of epistemic 
practices of OC in maintaining positive epistemic outcomes, such as the production of 
quality knowledge, safe information, and innovative practices. In particular, findings 
from the diabetes OC identified key epistemic practices that individual members took 
in justifying knowledge. They also offered insights into the collective epistemic 
practices that the OC enacted to facilitate a virtuous epistemic enquiry by its 
members. 
Drawing on a virtue epistemology perspective, findings showed that individual 
participants to this study and the community as a collective were motivated to and 
capable of enacting virtuous epistemic practices. These practices allowed individuals 
to distinguish the value and appropriateness of knowledge in OC to achieve their 
goals and were crucial for maintaining quality and consistency of knowledge 
production within the community. A summary of these practices and their intellectual 
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A Summary of Collective Epistemic Practices of the OC and their Associated 
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Experiential evidence and knowledge played a crucial part in guiding the 
epistemic enquiry of participants. This form of enquiry allowed participants to be 
open to other people’s experiences (open-mindedness); have confidence in testing 




managing diabetes was reliable (intellectual temperance and scrutiny); have the 
intellectual humility to recognize the limitations of their own knowledge and medical 
knowledge in general. This encouraged other members of the community to evaluate 
knowledge based on reasoned argument and justification and by reflecting about the 
experimentation of new ideas (intellectual reflectiveness). 
The epistemic agency of the community was also crucial in encouraging 
epistemically virtuous behaviours. It fostered the intellectual autonomy of its 
members by encouraging them to form independent epistemic judgments about 
information shared on the forum. It maintained intellectual integrity in making sure 
that knowledge contribution was not harmful or misleading. It showed intellectual 
courage in disciplining the epistemic intemperance and hubris of members that made 
inappropriate and epistemically dangerous knowledge contributions. Through critical 
discursive interactions, it did not force members to agree with a particular idea, but 
encouraged them to form their own independent judgment through reason and 
argument (intellectual reflectiveness). 
Yet, the study demonstrated the ambivalence of epistemic practices, that is, 
epistemic practices that are well intentioned and have apparent positive epistemic 
effects can also have unintended consequences and conceal intellectual vices. For 
example, findings suggest that reliance on experiential evidence could limit the focus 
of community members’ epistemic enquiry on stories from people with whom they 
shared similar traits and identified the most (learning myopia). Desires and goals that 
guide an epistemic enquiry could also conceal the trap of confirmation bias by 
focusing members’ attention on evidence that confirmed their beliefs. Finally, 
intellectual humility could wrongly induce community members to avoid conflict and 




mechanisms of OC (e.g. likes) could conceal the risk of epistemic injustice because, 
inadvertently, they could intimidate an individual to justify beliefs and actions that 
contradict the views held by the majority of members.  
Implications 
This study contributes to the literature on the implications of OC and, more 
specifically, OHC in knowledge co-production. Latest research has focused on OC as 
monolithic entities by focusing on how social and structural mechanisms influence 
knowledge contribution (e.g. Ma and Agarwal 2007) and social interactions (e.g. Aral 
and Walker 2014). This study helps shed light onto the practices of individual 
community members together with their desires, goals, and emotions. Even though it 
is undeniable that individual members of OC have common epistemic goals and 
emotions that drive their epistemic enquiry, it is important to recognize them as 
epistemic autonomous agents to fully appreciate the extent to which they are engaging 
with OC in an epistemically safe and responsible way. Taking homophily as an 
example, research has shown that social network sites and OC can reinforce the 
tendency of forming strong social ties with people that share common traits (e.g. age, 
ethnicity, attitudes, beliefs) (Centola and van de Rijt 2015). Strong ties with like-
minded people present the risk of confirmation bias since they reduce opportunities to 
critically evaluate online content by contrasting opposed views (Matthews and 
Stephens 2010). Even though this study has confirmed the risk of this bias, it has also 
demonstrated the complexity of community members’ epistemic practices and their 
motivation and ability to pursue a virtuous epistemic enquiry.  
The collective epistemic agency of the community has not been properly 




as roles (Arazy et al. 2016), and social exchange mechanisms (Faraj and Johnson 
2011; Huysman and Wulf 2006), such as reciprocity. Through a virtue epistemology 
perspective, this study increases the understanding of OC as epistemically and, 
consequently, socially responsible actors in the production of information and 
knowledge that is not harmful. In particular, a community to be epistemically 
responsible has to encourage critical discursive interactions. Future research could 
consider the role of influencers and authority in OC in influencing such interactions. 
By combining a structural with an agency-focused approach, future research could 
also investigate social capital mechanisms (e.g. identification, reciprocity) in 
influencing critical discursive interactions.   
A further implication of this study concerns the epistemic consequences of 
Internet technologies (Miller and Record 2013) and, more specifically OC sites. Past 
research shows that material features that are unique to these sites (e.g. user ID, 
number of likes) mediate social mechanisms that attract knowledge contribution, such 
as identity verification (Ma and Agarwal 2007) and social status (Levina and Arriaga 
2014). This study has demonstrated the potential of peer-agreement mechanisms to 
lead to epistemic injustice. This is not to say that OC sites have negative epistemic 
consequences, but this finding problematizes the material agency of OC sites in 
influencing our capacity to act as responsible epistemic agents in forming justified 
true beliefs. 
A second set of implications from this study concerns OHC as a source of 
innovation in health management practices and medical knowledge. Research in this 
area has mainly focused on the dangers that experiential knowledge and anecdotal 
evidence pose to medical expertise and science (e.g. Whelan 2007). Findings in this 




gains a higher position in the hierarchy of knowledge not in competition with but as a 
means to test medical research and clinical advice. Experiential knowledge shared in 
OHC constitutes an engine of innovation, whereby patients can experiment new 
health management practices that have not yet gained legitimacy in institutionalised 
clinical practices and guidelines. Most of all, as shown in this study, experiential 
knowledge and evidence can play a crucial part in encouraging a set of intellectual 
virtues that ensure safe epistemic practices, innovation, and knowledge quality, such 
as open- mindedness, consistency, and objectivity. 
Furthermore, this study highlights the importance of community members’ goals 
and motivations in driving epistemic enquiry. Participation to the diabetes OC did not 
lead to a change of heart concerning diabetes management. Instead, it confirmed 
participants’ initial health and treatment beliefs (e.g. treating diabetes with less 
medication). The risk of confirmation bias influencing OHC members’ epistemic 
enquiry is possible. Yet, the evidence presented in this paper is limited and more 
research concerning this risk is needed. Finally, whereas previous research has mainly 
focused on individual epistemic practices in OHC (Hanell and Salö 2015), this study 
demonstrates the implications of collective epistemic practices of OHC in 
encouraging intellectual autonomy and independent enquiry. These practices can have 
positive therapeutic effects in supporting patients’ informed choice about their own 
health.  
This study also has implications for practice. First, it shows patients that are new 
to OHC the right attitudes and intellectual virtues in the search and evaluation of 
information. It also shows the value of experiential knowledge in experimenting new 
approaches to the management of a chronic condition with open-mindedness, 




believing claims that cannot be proven through experimentation and that can 
constitute a threat to public health. An example is claims about the relationship 
between vaccines and autism in anti-vaccination OC. Second, findings from this 
research can advise healthcare professionals on the epistemic practices that they 
should recommend to their patients in order to navigate OHC safely. It also shows 
that, when guided by intellectual virtues, experiential epistemic enquiry in OHC is a 
source of experimentation with new medical research that does not yet have a place in 
clinical practice. In this sense, OHC can be seen as engines of innovation in clinical 
practice. Finally, findings from this research have implications for managers of OC. 
In particularly, it shows the value of designing community features that encourage 
peer-disagreement and constructive critical discourse.   
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